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INTRODUCTION

In Texas, people can face up to life in prison for breach of contract.
The "contract" in question is one imposed on a "sexually violent
predator" (SVP) in an outpatient civil commitment proceeding. The
"breach" leading to a lengthy prison term could be something as
seemingly innocuous as using a post office box or "sit[ting] and watching people."'
The recent Texas Supreme Court case, In re Commitment of Fisher,2
provides a compelling view into the practical operation of the Texas
SVP statute. 3 The case reflects a legal gray area (or "shadowland")
created when civil proceedings take on punitive (quasi-criminal) functions, and will serve as a lens through which to examine the larger
issue of civil commitment of sex offenders in Texas.
In contrast to SVP statutes in other states,4 Texas law is unique in
providing for outpatient commitment, as opposed to inpatient psychiatric hospitalization, for convicted sex offenders released from
prison.5 It also provides that a violation of any of the provisions of the
SVP's outpatient commitment "contract" is a third-degree felony.6
Although, as Fisher and other cases suggest,7 the Texas statute may
1. Commitment of Fisher v. State, 123 S.W.3d 828, 840 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2003) (en banc) (reproducing the Civil Commitment Requirements: Treatment
and Supervision Contract), rev'd sub nom. In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d
637 (Tex. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 428 (2005).
2. In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 428 (2005).
3. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 841.001 to .150 (Vernon 2003 & Supp.
2006).
4. See generally, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701 to -3717 (2003); CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE §§ 6600 to 6609.3 (West 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.910 to .931

(West 2006); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/1 to 207/99 (West 2002 & Supp. 2006);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 229A.1 to .16 (West 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to 29a21 (2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A §§ 1 to 16 (West 2003); MINN. STAT.

ANN. §§ 253B.185(1) to (7) (West Supp. 2006); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 632.480 to .513
(West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-27.24 to -27.38 (West Supp. 2006); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 25-03.3-01 to -24 (2002 & Supp. 2005); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6401 to
09 (West Supp. 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-48-10 to -170 (2002 & Supp. 2005); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 37.2-900 to -919 (2005 & Supp. 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 71.09.010 to .902 (West 2002 & Supp. 2006); Wis. STAT. §§ 980.01 to .13 (West 1998
& Supp. 2005).
5. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.081 (Vernon 2003 & Supp.

2006).
6. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.085 (Vernon 2003).
7. See, e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) (holding the Kansas SVP statute
constitutional); Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001) (same for Washington); Kansas v.
176
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (same for Kansas).
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continue to be held constitutional, it nevertheless is deeply flawed and
should be changed or replaced for public policy reasons. Such reasons
include (1) that the law fails to protect the public because it allows
SVPs to roam loose and (2) that it dooms SVPs to return to prison,
where they typically receive no treatment.8 This Note will suggest
some possible improvements to Texas's approach to handling the offenders it and other states have chosen to label "sexually violent
predators," including the option that Texas replace its SVP statute
with an inpatient civil commitment regime similar to those in other
states.
Part II of this Note will reflect some historical background behind
civil commitment, including the traditional rationales underlying it,
the early emphasis on procedural due process in nineteenth century
American jurisprudence, and the development of commitment laws
specifically aimed at sex offenders in the twentieth century. Part III
will address the state of the law on this issue in Texas, which provides
for a unique statutory outpatient regime. Part IV will focus on the
Fisher case, following it through every step of litigation, from Michael
Fisher's commitment hearing, through the state appellate process, to
the denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court. Along
the way, it will highlight the ways in which Fisher exemplifies
problems in the practical application of the Texas SVP statute. Finally, Part V will point out some changes the legislature has made to
the SVP statute since its initial adoption in 1999 and will suggest additional needed changes.
II.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Twin Justifications at Common Law

In the United States, as in England, the common law originally controlled the civil commitment of the mentally ill. 9 The twin justifications traditionally relied upon for the detention of the insane have
been (1) parens patriae and (2) the police power of the state.10 The
8. See Transcript of Record vol. 3 at 94, In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d
637 (Tex. 2005) (No. 00-10-06622-CV) [hereinafter Transcript vol. 3] (copy on file with
author) (noting that, with twenty-four to twenty-six thousand sex offenders in the
Texas Department of Corrections, there were only four to five hundred treatment
beds available).
9. See ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF
THEIR CARE AND TREATMENT FROM COLONIAL TIMES 419 (2d ed., rev. & enlarged,
Columbia Univ. Press 1949).
10. BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
MODEL

3-4 (2005);

JUDITH LYNN FAILER, WHO QUALIFIES FOR RIGHTS? HOMELESS-

NESS, MENTAL ILLNESS, AND CIVIL COMMITMENT

68 (2002); Sarah E. Spierling, Com-

ment, Lock Them Up and Throw Away the Key: How Washington's Violent Sexual
PredatorLaw Will Shape the Future Balance Between Punishment and Prevention, 9
J.L. & POL'Y 879, 887 (2001); but see CHRISTOPHER R. WILLIAMS & BRUCE A. ARRIGO, LAW, PSYCHOLOGY, AND JUSTICE: CHAOS THEORY AND THE NEW (DIS)ORDER

183-85 (Austin T. Turk ed., 2002) (suggesting that, beyond police power and parens 177

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

3

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 13 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 7

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

former rationale refers to the state's parental role in caring for those
who cannot care for themselves.11 The latter focuses on the state's
duty to protect the public.' 2 Over the centuries, there has been some
tension between the two justifications, with one or the other gaining
ascendancy during different periods. 13 Generally, however, courts invoke both justifications when deciding on civil commitment.1 4 Hence
the well-worn catch phrase15 that appears in commitment documents,
"danger to self or others."'
Perhaps surprisingly, in one of the earliest cases in the United
States dealing with civil commitment, the court placed great emphasis
on due process (later an important focus in Fisher and other SVP litigation). 6 In late December 1839, in the town of Eaton, New Hampshire, a selectman named Jackson, receiving word that a local man
named Colby had gone dangerously mad, locked Colby in a cage,
wherein he remained for almost six weeks. 7 By all accounts, Colby
was insane to the point that his friends and family feared for both his
safety and their own. 18 All concurred that his forcible detention was
urgently necessary. 9 Four of his sons helped to construct the cage in
which Jackson then held him.2"
In accordance with New Hampshire law, Jackson and the other
selectmen of the town applied to the judge of probate, who issued a
warrant authorizing them to assess Colby's state and return to the
court with their opinion.2" The selectmen dutifully interviewed the
available witnesses and concluded that Colby was insane.2 2 Without
explanation, however, they failed to return to the probate court with
their findings. 23 Colby's madness was apparently of a temporary napatriae, an unspoken set of common cultural referents underlie civil commitments,
informing and unifying otherwise contradictory medical and legal views).
11. WINICK, supra note 10, at 3-4; FAILER, supra note 10, at 68-69; Spierling,
supra note 10, at 887.
12. WINICK, supra note 10, at 3-4; FAILER, supra note 10, at 70; Spierling, supra
note 10, at 887.
13. FAILER, supra note 10, at 71-87.
14. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80, 96 (1992) (noting both parens
patriaeand police power justifications for civil commitment); O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1975) (same).
15. See, e.g., In re Howard N., 106 P.3d 305, 316 (Cal. 2005); State v. White, 891
So. 2d 502, 504 (Fla. 2004); N.W. v. State, 678 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1984, no writ).
16. See Colby v. Jackson, 12 N.H. 526 (Super. Ct. 1842).
17. Id. at 527. The background information appearing on pages 527 through 529 is
most likely the work of the reporter, not the court.
18. See id. at 527-28.
19. See id. at 528.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 527.
22. Id. at 527-28.

23. See id. at 528, 532.
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ture. He later sued Jackson for trespass, and the jury awarded him
one dollar in damages. 4
On appeal, the New Hampshire Superior Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Gilchrist, affirmed the trial court's judgment.25 In
doing so, the Court held that town selectmen do not, ex officio, have
the power to incarcerate the insane without due process of law. Justice Gilchrist wrote that Jackson had the same right as anyone else to
subdue and detain Colby initially due to the exigency of the circumstances.2 6 He analogized to English authorities that held, for example,
that one person may physically restrain another to prevent him from
injuring himself or murdering his wife.27 Jackson's "culpable omission
of duty" was in failing to follow through with the procedures required
by the laws of the state.2 8
The trial court had correctly rejected Jackson's request for a jury
charge that, if they found that Colby was insane, and that it was dangerous for him to be at large, Jackson "had a right to confine him so
long as he should continue thus insane and dangerous. '29 The Court
held that "such an authority is possessed by no person, unless under
the sanctions, and after compliance with the forms, of law." 30 Gilchrist made a "slippery slope" argument in support of the decision,
fearing that, without such adherence to the forms of law, "[e]very cage
would be a licensed private mad-house." 3 1
Justice Gilchrist looked darkly back to the days of the Vagrant Act
in the England of George II, when justices of the peace were authorized to "confine lunatics 'of the poorer sort ...for confining, binding,
and beating the unhappy man, in such manner as is proper and requisite .. ."32
He wryly observed, "[t]he quantum of beating which is
proper for 'the unhappy man,' being, of course, in the discretion of his
keeper."3 3 Gilchrist then reassured his readers that "the existence of
such laws has passed away with the narrow views which produced
them . . ,34 This assertion may have been premature, but many of
the observations made by Justice Gilchrist in Colby remain relevant
today.
24. See id. at 526-29, 534.
25. Id. at 527. From 1776 to 1876, the Superior Court of Judicature was the highest state appellate court in New Hampshire. See Judicial Branch New Hampshire,
Supreme Court, http://www.nh.gov/judiciary/supreme/about.htm (last visited Sept. 18,
2006).
26. See id. at 530-31.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 532.
29. See id. at 532-33.
30. Id. at 532.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 532-33.
33. Id. at 533.
34. Id.
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Sex Crimes and Statutes

In the 1930s, alarmed by a perceived wave of sex crimes appearing
in the media, people in the United States brought pressure to bear on
state legislatures to pass laws addressing the alleged problem.3 5 Michigan enacted the first of these "sex psychopath" statutes in 1937.36
1. Emphasis on Treatment: the Parens PatriaeApproach
Although aimed at protecting the public, these laws focused largely
on treatment of the offenders. 37 They provided for indefinite detention for treatment in lieu of imprisonment and were not considered
punitive. 38 This reflects an emphasis placed on the treatment of the
mentally ill during this period. 39 The committed individual would remain in a psychiatric facility until fully recovered or no longer dangerous.4" Each state had its own set of procedures to determine which
criminal defendants would be thus diverted from the criminal justice
system to the mental health system, and how the committed person
could obtain release upon recovery.4 1
The statutes did not go unchallenged. 4 2 They were attacked for denying due process and equal protection, for placing the accused in
double jeopardy, for being ex post facto laws, for requiring self-incrimination, and for imposing cruel and unusual punishment.4 3
To expand on just one example, in 1940, Minnesota's "psychopathic
personality" statute survived a challenge alleging that it violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection guarantees.4 4 The statute defined "psychopathic personality" as:
any person of such conditions of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary standards of good judgment,
or failure to appreciate the consequences of his acts, or a combination of any such conditions, as to render such person irresponsible
35. Raquel Blacher, Comment, Historical Perspective of the "Sex Psychopath"
Statute: From the Revolutionary Era to the Present Federal Crime Bill, 46 MERCER L.
REv.889, 889-900 (1995).
36. Id. at 897.
37. See id. at 901.
38. See id. at 912.
39. See FAILER, supra note 10, at 79.
40. See Blacher, supra note 35, at 897-98.
41. See id. at 899-900.
42. Id. at 902.
43. See, e.g., Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 274 (1940)
(holding that the statute did not violate equal protection or due process); People v.
Chapman, 4 N.W.2d 18, 28 (Mich. 1942) (holding that the statute does not impose
cruel and unusual punishment); Exparte Keddy, 233 P.2d 159, 161 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1951) (holding that the statute does not violate double jeopardy prohibition); State ex
rel. Sweezer v. Green, 232 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Mo. 1950) (holding that the statute was
not ex post facto criminal sanction); see also Blacher, supra note 35, at 902 (summarizing case law on these issues for this period).
44. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 276-77 (1940). 180
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for his conduct with respect to sexual matters and thereby dangerous to other persons.4 5
Alleged psychopath Charles Pearson argued that the statute violated equal protection because it applied to individuals within a larger
class: all those "guilty of sexual misconduct" or "having strong sexual
propensities."4 6 The Court rejected this argument, holding that the
State had a "rational basis" for creating a separate class for habitual
sex offenders.4 7 Equally unavailing was Pearson's due process claim.
The procedural safeguards outlined in the statute, such as a hearing
before the probate court, the provision of counsel for the alleged psychopath, and the appointment of two licensed doctors to examine him,
were sufficient to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment.4 8 Pearson's argument that he would be doomed to spend the rest of his life in an
asylum likewise failed to persuade due to the statutory provisions allowing him, or anyone else, to petition the committing court for his
release.4 9
2.

Shift in Emphasis Toward Police Power

Despite surviving constitutional challenges, many states had repealed their sex offender commitment laws by the 1980s. 5 0 This was
due in part to a growing perception that sex offenders are not mentally ill and that they do not respond to treatment. 51 During this same
period, there was also a "rising concern for civil rights"5 2 reflected as a
53 Court decisions inrenewed concern for procedural due process.
54
rights."
of
creasingly invoked the "language
Accompanying this trend was a move away from the emphasis on
treatment and the parens patriaerationale prevalent in the 1930s and
1940s. Instead, the police power of the state and the need to protect
the public became the dominant rationale underlying civil commitment. 6 By the 1970s, most civil commitments rested primarily on police power.5 7
The most influential case involving civil commitment during the
1970s, and one that reflected this shift in emphasis, was O'Connor v.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 272.
See id. at 273.
See id. at 274.
See id. at 275-76.
See id. at 276.
Blacher, supra note 35, at 906.
Id.
Id.

53. See
54.
55.
56.
57.

FAILER,

supra note 10, at 83-85.

Id. at 85.
See id. at 80-87.
See id. at 87.
Id.
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Donaldson. 8 In that case, Kenneth Donaldson was involuntarily confined for fifteen years for "care, maintenance, and treatment."5 9 In
fact, there was little if any treatment involved other than "milieu therapy"-a "euphemism for confinement in the 'milieu' of a mental hospital."6
Donaldson eventually sued the superintendent of the
hospital, contending that he posed no danger to anyone and could live
safely out of confinement.6 1 The trial court agreed.6 2 Donaldson
gained his freedom and went promptly to work in hotel administration.6 3 The court awarded both actual and punitive damages.64
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit emphasized Donaldson's right to treatment. It addressed the question "whether the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right to treatment to persons involuntarily civilly
committed to state mental hospitals., 65 It held that when, as in Donaldson's case, the rationale underlying the confinement was the patient's need for treatment, that minimally adequate treatment must be
provided. 66 In doing so, the court implied that the Constitution permitted the state to confine an individual in need of treatment regard67
less of whether the person was a danger to self or others.
The Supreme Court disagreed, opining that there was no need to
address the question whether a person who was both mentally ill and
dangerous had a right to treatment. 68 Rather, the important consideration for purposes of involuntary commitment was dangerousness.
The Court held that there was "no constitutional basis for confining
such [mentally ill] persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no
one and can live safely in freedom. '69 Following Donaldson, civil
commitment statutes survive judicial scrutiny if they satisfy three criteria: (1) the committed person suffers mental illness; (2) is a danger
to self or others; and (3) there is no less restrictive alternative. 70

58. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
59. Id. at 565-66.
60. Id. at 569.
61. See id. at 568.
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 572.
65. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 509 (5th Cir. 1974).
66. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 572.
67. See id. at 572.
68. Id. at 573.
69. Id. at 575.
70. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992) (averring that a state must
establish both insanity and dangerousness to justify civil commitment); O'Connor,422
U.S. at 575-76 (holding that a state cannot confine a non-dangerous mentally ill individual who is capable of living safely in freedom); see also Spierling, supra note 10, at
889.
182

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol13/iss1/7
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V13.I1.6

8

Hall: In the Shadowlands: Fisher and the Outpatient Civil Commitment of

2006]

SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS IN TEXAS

183

C. SVP Statutes
Beginning in the early 1990s, states began passing civil commitment
laws that "blur the line between civil laws, which are treatment-oriented, and criminal laws, which are designed to punish specific behavior."7 1 The first state to pass a statute of the current "sexually violent
predator" variety was Washington.7 2 This legislation resulted from a
particularly horrific sex crime that generated a great deal of media
attention.7 3 Earl K. Shriner had been released from prison for only a
short time when he kidnapped, raped, strangled, and sexually mutilated a seven-year-old boy in 1988. TM In response to the public outcry
following this crime, Washington passed the Community Protection
Act in 1990." s The Act included provisions authorizing the indefinite
civil commitment of people found to be "sexually violent predators."7 6
The previously existing civil commitment statute was found inadequate to deal with repeat sex offenders because it required that the
person committed be mentally ill as well as dangerous.7 7 Many sex
offenders, like Earl Shriner, failed to meet the mental illness requirement.7 8 To fill this gap, the Washington legislature crafted a statute
specifically addressing the problem such dangerous individuals posed
once they could no longer be kept in prison.7 9
In its legislative findings, Washington noted that "a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators exist who do
not have a mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate for
the existing involuntary treatment act . . ."80 The new "sexually violent predator" statute applied to people convicted of a sexually violent
offense who are about to be released from prison; those charged with
a sexually violent offense found incompetent to stand trial; those
found not guilty by reason of insanity of a sexually violent crime; and
those convicted of a sexually violent crime who have been previously
released, but who have committed a "recent overt act" and "it appears
that the person may be a sexually violent predator."8 1
The statute defines "sexually violent predator" as "any person who
has been convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual violence and
who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which
makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Spierling, supra note 10, at 890.
Id. at 892.
Id.; see also Blacher, supra note 35, at 908-09.
Spierling, supra note 10, at 892; see also Blacher, supra note 35, at 908.
Spierling, supra note 10, at 892-93.
Id. at 893.
See Blacher, supra note 35, at 907.
Id. at 909.
See id. at 907-11.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 2002).
Id. § 71.09.030.
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if not confined in a secure facility."8 2 The alleged "sexually violent
predator" has the right to counsel during the commitment hearing and
the right to demand a jury trial. If, after a hearing, the person is found
beyond a reasonable doubt to be a "sexually violent predator," he is
committed indefinitely to the State Department of Social and Health
Services "until such time as: (a) [his] condition has so changed that
[he] no longer meets the definition of a sexually violent predator; or
(b) conditional release to a less restrictive alternative.., is in the best
interest of the person and conditions
can be imposed that would ade83
quately protect the community.
Following Washington's lead, numerous states began to pass statutes providing for the indefinite, involuntary civil commitment of individuals found to be "sexually violent predators."8 4 These statutes
tend to employ similar language in their findings and definitions. For
example, the Kansas SVP statute defines "sexually violent predator"
in much the same way as Washington: "any person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers
from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the
person likely to engage in the [sic] predatory acts of sexual

violence. "85
The Kansas SVP statute came under immediate constitutional attack. Leroy Hendricks, an inmate with a long history of molesting
children, was the first person committed under the Kansas statute.
Hendricks was about to be released from prison when the statute went
into effect.86 He challenged the statute's validity in state court on due
process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto grounds. 87 The trial court
declined to rule on the constitutional issues, but found probable cause
that Hendricks was a sexually violent predator and ordered him to be
held for evaluation at a state hospital pending a jury trial. 88 Faced
with evidence of Hendricks's long history of child sexual abuse, the
jury found that he was a sexually violent predator.8 9 The trial court
also determined, as a matter of law, that pedophilia was a "mental
abnormality" as defined in the statute. 9°
On appeal, Hendricks continued to pursue his due process, double
jeopardy, and ex post facto claims. 9 ' The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and invalidated the statute on
due process grounds alone. It held that, in order to involuntarily com82. Id. § 71.09.020.
83. Id. § 71.09.060.
84. Spierling, supra note 10, at 894-95.

85.

KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 59-29a02(a) (1994).

86. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 354.
89. Id. at 355.
90. Id. at 355-56.
91. Id. at 356.
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mit someone in a civil proceeding, the individual must be both mentally ill and dangerous. Additionally, the Court held that the statute's
definition of "mental abnormality" did not satisfy the "mental illness"
requirement.92 The United States Supreme Court, in turn, granted
certiorari and reversed. In an opinion authored by Justice Thomas,
the Court held that the term "mental illness" does not have "talismanic significance," and that states are not required "to adopt any
particular nomenclature in drafting civil commitment statutes."9 3 The
Court noted that "'psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on
what constitutes mental illness,"' 94 and that courts and legislatures
have adopted different terminologies to refer to "volitional impairment[s]" that make people "dangerous beyond their control."9' These
semantic variations do not, by themselves, violate due process.9 6
Perhaps more interestingly, the Court chose to address the double
jeopardy and ex post facto claims that Hendricks had raised on crosspetition, but that were never reached by the lower courts. 97 Hendricks argued that the Kansas statute established criminal proceedings
and that his confinement under it was punishment for past criminal
wrongdoing. Because the statute was passed after the crimes were
committed and because he had already served his prison sentence, the
statute violated the Constitution's ex post facto and double jeopardy
prohibitions.9 8 In order to address these claims, the Court had to determine whether the statute was civil or criminal in nature.
The analysis of this issue began with the presumption that it "'is
first of all a question of statutory construction.' "99 The Court acknowledged that the legislature simply labeling a statute "civil" is not
necessarily dispositive of the question. 1" The label, however, combined with other considerations, such as Kansas's choice to include the
statute in the probate code rather than the criminal code, led the
Court to give initial deference to the legislature's express intent:
"Nothing on the face of the statute suggests that the legislature sought
to create anything other than a civil commitment scheme designed to
protect the public from harm." ' To overcome this deferential presumption that the statute is civil would require "'the clearest proof"'
that it is "'so punitive in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's]
intention' to deem it 'civil.' "12
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id. at 359.
Id. (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985)).
Id. at 358.
See id. at 360.
See id. at 360-61.
Id. at 361; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361 (quoting Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1986)).
Id. at 361 (quoting Allen, 478 U.S. at 369).
Id.
1
Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)).
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The Court concluded that the statutory scheme was not punitive

because it failed to meet the two purposes of criminal punishment:
retribution and deterrence.1 °3 The statute was not retributive because

it looked to prior criminal conduct, not to assign blame, but merely to
predict future dangerousness. 10

4

The fact that the statute was "'tied to

criminal activity"' did not automatically make it punitive.10 5 Moreover, the Court held the statute could serve no deterrent purpose because persons committed under it were, by definition, unable to
control their behavior. 10 6 Because the Court held that the Kansas

SVP statute was civil rather than criminal, both the ex post facto and
double jeopardy claims-applicable exclusively to criminal proceed-

ings-failed.0 7 Hendricks remains the most influential case uphold08

ing the constitutionality of state SVP "civil" commitment statutes.
III.

THE LAW IN TEXAS

In some ways, the Texas SVP statute resembles those in other
states. For example, the language in the legislative findings is virtually
identical to statutes in states like Washington and Kansas: "A small
but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators exists
.... "o109 The Texas statute, however, is hardly a "copycat" law. It is
unique in several respects. For example, Texas defines SVPs as having
"a behavioral abnormality" rather than a "mental disease or defect."" 0 More significantly, Texas is the only state to provide for outpatient commitment rather than inpatient treatment in secure
facilities."' Closely connected to this, and again unique among the
states, the Texas statute provides for criminal penalties for the violation of any requirements of outpatient commitment. 112 Any such vio103. See id. at 361-62.
104. Id. at 362.
105. Id. (quoting United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996)).
106. Id.
107. See id. at 369-71.
108. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); see also State's Petition for Review
at 6-9, In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. 2005) (No. 04-0112) [hereinafter State's Petition] (referring repeatedly to Hendricks as the preeminent authority on this issue).
109. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.001 (Vernon 2003); see IOWA
CODE ANN. § 229A.1 (West 2006); KAN. STAT. PROB. ANN. § 59-29a01 (West Supp.
2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 2002).
110. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.001 (Vernon 2003); cf., e.g., IowA
CODE ANN. § 229A.1 (West Supp. 2005) (employing "mental disease of defect");
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994) (same).
111. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.081 (Vernon Supp. 2006); Al-

lison Taylor, Civil Commitments of Sexually Violent Predators,THE

TEXAS PROSECU-

Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 36 (discussing unique aspects of Texas SVP statute); Rahn K.
Bailey, Sexually Violent Predators: Texas' Moderate Approach to Civil Commitment,
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. NEWSL., Sept. 2001, http://www.emory.edu/AAPL/
newsletter/N263_Sexually %20violent%20predators.htm (same).
112. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.085 (Vernon 2003).
18(

TOR,
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lation is a third-degree felony.11 3 Because almost all SVPs under the
statute have prior felony convictions, an additional third-degree felony can send them back to prison for life.1 14 The requirements imposed on the committed individual are:
(1) requiring the person to reside in a Texas residential facility
under contract with the council or at another location or facility approved by the council;
(2) prohibiting the person's contact with a victim or potential victim of the person;
(3) prohibiting the person's possession or use of alcohol, inhalants,
or a controlled substance;
(4) requiring the person's participation in and compliance with a
specific course of treatment;
(5) requiring the person to:
(A) submit to tracking under a particular type of tracking
service and to any other appropriate supervision; and
(B) refrain from tampering with, altering, modifying, obstructing, or manipulating the tracking equipment;
(6) prohibiting the person from changing the person's residence
without prior authorization from the judge and from leaving the
state without that prior authorization;
(7) if determined appropriate by the judge, establishing a child
safety zone in the same manner as [required under the] Code of
Criminal Procedure, and requiring the person to comply with requirements related to the safety zone;
(8) requiring the person to notify the case manager immediately
but in any event within 24 hours of any change in the person's status
that affects proper treatment and supervision, including a change in
the person's physical health or job status and including any incarceration of the person; and

(9)

any other requirements determined necessary by the judge." 5

Although subsection (9) above appears to allow the judge some discretion in imposing additional requirements, in practice, all committed
SVPs are required to adhere to the same 97 additional contractual
obligations." 6 This may be due, in part, to the fact that the statute
requires all SVP commitment hearings to be held in the same
county." 7 Attorneys for the State Counsel for Offenders are appointed to represent alleged SVPs at these hearings." 8 These attorneys report that SVP commitment hearings are almost invariably
113. Id.
114. See Commitment of Fisher v. State, 123 S.W.3d 828, 840 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2003) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637
(Tex. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 428 (2005).
115. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.082 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
116. See Commitment of Fisher,123 S.W.3d at 851-58 (reproducing the Civil Com-

mitment Requirements: Treatment and Supervision Contract).
117. See TEX.

HEALTH

&

SAFETY CODE ANN.

§ 841.041 (Vernon 2003 & Supp.

2006) (permitting the state attorney to file a petition in Montgomery County).
118. TEX.

HEALTH

& SAFETY

CODE ANN.
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heard by the same judge, Putnam K. Reiter, and this also contributes
to the consistency with which the same contractual requirements are
imposed.' 19 The committed SVP must agree to these additional provisions and faces a third-degree felony charge for breaching any of
them. 120 Some of the more extreme examples of these provisions
include:
5. I will not have direct or indirect contact with children unless supervised ....

6. If I am in an area where children are, I will leave the area....
9. I will not have any contact with family members unless approved
by the Case Manager and Treatment Staff....
10. I understand that family members may be required to submit to
a criminal background check before I can have contact with them.
15. I will not watch R-rated movies or TV programs unless I discuss
it with the Case Manager and Treatment Staff and receive prior
written approval ....
17. I will not cruise for victims. That is, I will not walk or ride
around aimlessly, nor will I sit and watch people.
18. I will not go to schools, parks, swimming pools, movie theaters,
public libraries, amusement parks, arcades or malls ....
19. I will not use prostitutes. I will not travel through or go to
places where prostitutes are located.
26. I will not use fetishism [sic].
27. I will not masturbate to deviant fantasies, especially to fantasies
of victims or potential victims. I will stop deviant fantasies when
they occur.
35. I will not engage in casual sex, that is, sex with persons with
whom I am not in a committed, monogamous relationship.
37. I will not have sexual contact with a person without first telling
him or her that I am a Sexually Violent Predator. Before I have
sexual contact with that person, I will sign a release permitting unfettered, two-way communication between the Case Manager and
Treatment Staff and my potential sexual partner. I understand that
the Case Manager and Treatment Staff must meet with my potential
sexual partner before I have sex with that person.

119. Interview with State Counsel for Offenders, in Huntsville, Tex. (Oct. 28, 2005)
[hereinafter Counsel Interview] (notes on file with author). In order to shield individual attorneys from potential political fallout, the Author has chosen to collectively cite
attorneys currently serving with the State Counsel for Offenders.
1 ;
120. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.085 (Vernon 2003).
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46. I will not buy, borrow, steal, possess or use cameras, video recorders, audio recorders, CD recorders, DVD recorders or any
other recording device.
48. I will not use a Post Office box.
55. If and when I am allowed to operate a motor vehicle, I will
never pick up hitchhikers or stop to help persons stranded on the
road.
82. I understand that I must have a written assignment ready to
present to every group therapy session. I understand that partially
completed work is not acceptable. I understand that I must be
working on revisions of worksheets or new versions of worksheets
at all times. I understand that I must be prepared to present at least
twenty minutes of worksheet material from my Client Handbook at
every group therapy session. When not presenting my own assignments, I agree to actively listen and
121 actively give feedback to group

members who do present topics.

It seems implausible that a person with "a behavioral abnormality that
12 2 would be
is not amenable to traditional mental illness treatment"
123
able to live up to such stringent requirements.
By all accounts, the primary reason for implementing an outpatient,
rather than an inpatient, commitment statute was to save the state
money. 124 In this respect, the Texas SVP statute may be considered a
success (especially if one ignores the expense of subsequent incarceration). 2 5 For example, in 2004, Texas spent on average only $31,000
per committed SVP, as compared to $66,456 in Iowa, $59,939 in New
Jersey,6 and a whopping $105,665 in Washington, to name only a
few.

12

Perhaps inevitably, the unique provisions of the Texas SVP law
raise unique questions. For example, does attaching criminal penalties
to the violation of a civil commitment regime create a "statutory
121. Commitment of Fisher,123 S.W.3d at 853-55, 857 (reproducing the Civil Commitment Requirements: Treatment and Supervision Contract).
122. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.001 (Vernon 2003).
123. See Council on Sex Offender Treatment, Texas Sexually Violent Predator Act,
http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/csot/csot-txsvp.doc (last visited Sept. 18, 2006) (giving a
concise and readable summary of the general provisions of the Texas SVP Act).
124. See Taylor, supra note 111, at 39; Council on Sex Offender Treatment, Civil
Commitment of the Sexually Violent Predator - History of Civil SVP Act, http://
www.dshs.state.tx.us/csot/csot-cctxhist.shtm (last visited Sept. 18, 2006) (stating unequivocally that "[tihe Outpatient Program was chosen strictly due to fiscal
constraints").
125. See Council on Sex Offender Treatment, State by State SVP Act Comparison,
http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/csot/csot-compar.shtm (last visited Sept. 18, 2006) (reflecting savings under Texas SVP commitments as compared with inpatient commitments
in other states).
126. Id.
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scheme ' 12 7 that is more punitive than the one held constitutional in
Kansas v. Hendricks? Or, on the contrary, is outpatient commitment
128
a laudable "less restrictive alternative" to inpatient treatment?
Similarly, because of the criminal penalties attached to violating the
outpatient commitment requirements, should the alleged SVP be ac129
corded criminal due process rights during the commitment hearing?
The SVP statute also raises broader public policy questions. Does it
adequately address the twin justifications of civil commitment: (1)
treatment of the individual and (2) protection of the public? With
respect to the latter, does it not in fact place the general public at
greater risk with "sexually violent predators" running loose, constrained only by the provisions of their commitment "contracts"?1 3 °
Does such "contractual" restraint make sense when applied to individuals who, by definition, are unable to control their sexually violent
behaviors?"' Does saving money alone justify placing the general
public at risk in this way? These are some of the questions raised
when one examines the recent case, In re Commitment of Fisher, 32 to
which this Note now, finally, turns.
IV.

THE COMMITMENT OF MICHAEL FISHER

1 33
Michael Fisher is a mentally retarded, paranoid schizophrenic.
He has two children from a common-law marriage that lasted some
five years.134 In the late 1980s, he pleaded guilty to two sexual assaults. 35 Both Fisher's sexual assault victims were adult women.
There is some evidence that both were prostitutes, and the assault
charges may have arisen as a result of a misunderstanding regarding
payment. 13 6 Considering Fisher's mental condition, this does not

127. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997).
128. See Bailey, supra note 111, at 22; State's Petition, supra note 108, at 7 (describ•ing the Texas SVP statute as "similar to, though less restrictive than" Kansas's SVP
statute).
129. See Commitment of Fisher v. State, 123 S.W.3d 828, 834-38 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 2003) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. In re Commitment of Fisher, 164
S.W.3d 637 (Tex. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 428 (2005).
130. See Robert Tharp & Diane Jennings, An Easy Out for Sexual Predators?,DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 9, 2006, at 1A (criticizing the outpatient SVP program on
this basis).

131. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.002 (Vernon 2003) (defining
"behavioral abnormality" as a "condition that, by affecting a person's emotional or
volitional capacity, predisposes the person to commit a sexually violent offense").
132. In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 428 (2005).

133. Commitment of Fisher, 123 S.W.3d at 832.
134. Transcript of Record vol. 5 at 22, In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637
(Tex. 2005) (No. 00-10-06622-CV) [hereinafter Transcript vol. 5] (copy on file with
author).

135. Commitment of Fisher, 123 S.W.3d at 833.
136. See id. at 833; Transcript of Record vol. 2 at 119, 121, In re Commitment of
Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. 2005) (No. 00-10-06622-CV) [hereinafter Transcript vjM0
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seem implausible. Fisher contends that he was not guilty, but that
other factors motivated his plea.' 3 7 He has had other brushes with the
law, but none of these were sexually related.' 38 For example, while on
probation he assaulted his wife and attempted to remove his satellite
monitoring device. 139 As Fisher's most recent term of imprisonment
neared its end, the State filed a petition in Montgomery County, pursuant to § 841.041 of the SVP statute, alleging him to be a "sexually
violent predator. ' ' 14° The following proceedings ensued as a result.
A.

The Hearing

The Fisher commitment hearing began May 29, 2001, in Montgomery County. 14 Christopher Thetford of the Special Prosecution Unit
(SPU) represented the State of Texas. 1 42 Two attorneys with the State
Counsel for Offenders, Dixie Pritchard and Etta Warman, represented
Fisher 43 in accordance with § 841.005(a) of the SVP statute.1 44 At the
outset, Ms. Pritchard filed motions for a continuance and a competency hearing. Judge Reiter noted that, as of that time, the recentlyenacted SVP statute had not undergone appellate review, but 1he
45
doubted that Texas law provided for a competency hearing under it.
The question was postponed until after voir dire. Prior to this, the
court addressed the panel regarding the style of the case, "the State of
Texas versus Michael Fisher" and added "[t]hat sounds like a criminal
case, but it's not. This is a civil case that will be tried before a jury. "146
1. Motion for Continuance
After empanelling the jury and dismissing them for the day, the
court returned to Fisher's motions for continuance and for a competency hearing.147 In support of the former, Ms. Pritchard called
Michael Fisher himself to the stand. 4 8 In spite of much incoherent
2] (copy on file with author); Transcript vol. 3, supra note 8, at 187-88 (testimony of
Michael Fisher).
137. Commitment of Fisher,123 S.W.3d at 833; see Transcript vol. 2, supra note 136,
at 177-220.
138. Commitment of Fisher, 123 S.W.3d at 833.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 832; see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.041 (Vernon
2003 & Supp. 2006) (permitting State's attorney to file a petition alleging that person
is a sexually violent predator).
141. See Transcript of Record vol. 1 at 1, In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d
637 (Tex. 2005) (No. 00-10-06622-CV) (copy on file with author).
142. Id. at 2.
143. Id.
144. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.005(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006) (stating that "the Office of State Counsel for Offenders shall represent an indigent person
subject to a civil commitment proceeding under this chapter").
145. See Transcript vol. 2, supra note 136, at 7.
146. Id. at 16.
147. See id. at 112-13.
148. See id. at 114-15.
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rambling, the testimony elicited from Fisher made it clear that, up until a very short time before, he had been too mistrustful of Ms. Pritchard to cooperate in preparation for the hearing.'4 9 The following
excerpt typifies the general tenor of Fisher's testimony:
A: [I] went home to my mama, ma'am. When I got home from my
mama, I gave my mama the car keys. I laid in bed and went to
sleep. I was tranquilizer, ma'am, and I had a little bit of drink with
her that night when I bought that beer, ma'am, at her apartment,
and we left the store. I did not have my penis. They didn't find, had
no kind of substance in her. I read my-what they call that serve-all
papers that Ms. Higgins gave me. Now, Ms. Higgins, I don't know
her whole name, she's a parole counselor. She say on there, you do
not have no emphysema, no kind of sperm, no kind of-you did not
penetrate her vagina. You did not have your sexual organ in her. I
was not guilty. It had on there "serve all."
Q [from Ms. Pritchard]: Mr. Fisher, now that you believe that for
some part that I'm on your side, would you allow me to speak to
your mother about your case so that I can prepare for your case?
A: I don't know for you to speak to my mother ma'am. My
mother, she don't read well. She don't understand well. She don't
comprehend
that well. She's kind of an elderly person, yes,
15 0
ma'am.

Although Ms. Pritchard explained to Fisher several times what a continuance was and why he needed one, he responded, "That's all right,
ma'am, 52no thank you."''
Accordingly, the court denied the
motion.

1

2.

Motion for a Competency Hearing

With respect to the motion for a competency hearing, the court
noted that, not only does § 841 not explicitly provide for a competency determination, but respondents in such proceedings would in
53
many cases likely not be competent to stand trial in a criminal case.
Additionally, the court did not "see that as being required in this proceeding."'15 4 Nevertheless, the court allowed Ms. Pritchard to make a
"bill of exceptions" by putting on any evidence she had regarding
competence. 55 The judge conceded, "if I err I'm confident a reviewing court will so tell me."156
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See id. at 115-29.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 137.
Id.
Id. at 138.
See id. at 139.
Id. at 138.
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Testimony of Dr. Floyd Jennings

With the jury still out of the courtroom, Ms. Pritchard called Dr.
Floyd Jennings, a psychologist and attorney. 1 57 After establishing Dr.
Jennings's bona fides, Ms. Pritchard questioned him about his examination of Fisher. 15 Dr. Jennings testified that, if the court were to
order Fisher to participate in an outpatient treatment program, Fisher
would be unable to do so due to his mental condition. 159 He further
opined that Fisher lacked the requisite understanding to assist counsel
in his defense. 160 As a lawyer, Dr. Jennings expressed the view that
"in any circumstance wherein a significant deprivation of liberty is involved . . . the issue of capacity to participate is a significant variable. ' 16' This raised due process concerns, as did the idea of "ordering
participation in a program in which the defendant was unable to participate and from which he could scarcely benefit.' 16 Jennings went
on to say that such an order would be tantamount to a "'sham'...
wherein the defendant or the patient would be anticipated to fail because he could not understand what is asked of him. ' 163 Treatment
programs for sex offenders are verbally intensive, he added, and require a "modicum
of intellect" for one to be able to participate
1 64
successfully.

On cross-examination, Mr. Thetford chastised Jennings for "educating the judge about the law" and asked him if he thought Fisher was
"dangerous." 165 Jennings replied that, if Thetford meant "dangerous"
in terms of the old civil commitment statute, 6 6 then Fisher was primarily a danger to himself, and only secondarily to others.16 7 In response
to Mr. Thetford's query whether Jennings could suggest a better alternative to the proposed outpatient commitment, Jennings made a
rather elaborate proposal.1 6 8 The upshot of the proposal aimed at
providing Fisher with protective custody and emergency detention
under the old civil commitment statute so that he could receive appro169
priate care at Vernon State Hospital, a secure psychiatric facility.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 139-40.
See id. at 144-45.
Id. at 145.
See id. at 145-46.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 148-49.
Id. at 149.
Id.
Id. at 149-50.

166. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 574.034 to .035 (Vernon 2003)
(requiring that a person ordered to undergo mental health services be a danger to self
or others due to mental illness).
167. Transcript vol. 2, supra note 136, at 150.
168. See id. at 151-53.
169. See id.; Commitment of Fisher v. State, 123 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 2003) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. In re Commitment of Fisher, 164
S.W.3d 637 (Tex. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 428 (2005).
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Mr. Thetford agreed that this would not be a bad idea, but said "[Y]ou
understand that judicially . . . I have no ability to do what you're
suggesting?" 17
b.

Testimony of Dr. Fred Fason

Ms. Pritchard next called Dr. Fred Lanier Fason, a psychiatrist.1 7 1
Dr. Fason testified as to Fisher's intellectual abilities, describing him
as "mildly retarded" with an I.Q. in the lower 60's.172 He also stated
that Fisher had no factual or rational understanding of the proceed1 73
ings and that there was no way he could stand trial competently.
He said that Fisher's "view of himself and of his situation is so unrealistic that it's psychotic. ' 174 Fason agreed with Dr. Jennings that it
would be impossible for Fisher to conform to the terms of an outpatient commitment
program.1 75 Mr. Thetford did not cross-examine
17 6
Dr. Fason.

c.

Closing Arguments

In closing argument on the threshold issue of a competency hearing,
Ms. Pritchard argued that although § 841 is silent on the issue of competency, various factors pointed toward the propriety of granting
one.1 7 7 For example, the statute provided that the defendant had the
right to appear at the trial, to communicate with his lawyer, and to
help cross-examine witnesses.1 78 It also provided for a court-appointed attorney, which civil trials normally do not. 179 Calling the
proceedings "quasi-criminal," Pritchard went on to point out that
§ 841 borrowed heavily from the Code of Criminal Procedure, including the burden of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." 180 Taken together, these factors1 indicated
that Fisher was entitled to a criminal
81
competency hearing.
In response, Mr. Thetford spoke on behalf of the State, saying that
he was "aware of the difficult position" that everyone was in, but "the
only authority that the Legislature or the Governor gave me under
this statute was to proceed to have Mr. Fisher committed as a sexually
violent predator. ' 182 He reiterated that there is no provision in the
170. Transcript vol. 2, supra note 136, at 157.
171. Id. at 159-60.
172. See id. at 167; see also Commitment of Fisher, 123 S.W.3d at 832.

173. Transcript vol. 2, supra note 136, at 165-66; see also Commitment of Fisher,123
S.W.3d at 832.
174. Transcript vol. 2, supra note 136, at 169.
175. Id.
176. See id. at 170; Commitment of Fisher, 123 S.W.3d at 832.
177. See Transcript vol. 2, supra note 136, at 171.
178. See id. at 171-72.
179. See id. at 172-73.
180. See id. at 173.

181. See id. at 174.
182. Id. at 175-76.
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statute requiring competence. 18 3 "If there is a solution, I will be glad
to hear it, but as it stands
now Chapter 841 is the only solution that
1 84
exists for Mr. Fisher.
In ruling on the motion for a competency hearing, the court pointed
out that it had previously held § 841 constitutional in response to a
request from the State Counsel for Offenders for a declaratory judgment on the matter.18 5 Until overturned, that decision would stand:
''a reviewing court may say the statute is unconstitutional and the
Texas Legislature had no knowledge of what it was doing when it
adopted this statute, and that, further, the Governor had no idea what
he was doing when he signed it into law. 1 8 6 The court went on to
explain that the fact that the statute adopted some procedures like
those of a criminal trial did not prevent the proceedings from being
civil and that the legislature must have been aware that many respondents under this statute would suffer from mental illness.' 87 If the legislature had wished to provide for a determination of competence, it
could easily have done so. 1 88 The motion was denied; the exception
was noted. 8 9
3.

The Jury Trial

At the subsequent hearing, before the jury was brought in, Ms.
Pritchard asked the court on behalf of Mr. Fisher for an abeyance in
order to reconsider the alternative solution suggested by Dr. Jennings:
that Fisher be committed to a secure facility under the old civil commitment statute.1 90 The court responded that such a solution "flies
directly in the face of Chapter 841 ...which provides a time frame for
civil commitment in the SVP cases."1 91 The court's concern was that
under the older statute, the release of the individual was determined
by "mental health experts" and could leave the public "completely at
risk."' 92 The two alternative solutions, he added, were "like apples
and catfish, they don't mix all that well."' 193 The court denied the motion to abate, once more noting Fisher's exception to the ruling. 194
Both sides brought experts to testify for the jury. On behalf of
Michael Fisher, Ms. Pritchard tried to impeach one of the State's witnesses, a psychologist named Doug Bertling, by pointing to the results
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See id. at 176.
Id. at 176-77.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 179.
See id. at 179-80.
See id. at 180.
See id. at 181.
See Transcript vol. 3, supra note 8, at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
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of one of the diagnostic tests relied on by the State-a form that Mr.
Bertling had filled out. 195 The test, called a Static-99, is used to predict the likelihood of future sexual offenses. 196 One of the questions
asked whether the individual has ever been married. 197 Bertling had
put "no" on Fisher's form in answer to that question, although Fisher
claimed to have been common-law married for five years. 198 The answer made a significant difference regarding how likely Fisher was to
re-offend, according to the test. Mr. Bertling had no explanation for
the error, and admitted that he may never have met with Fisher at all,
relying instead on notes taken by a subordinate. 199
Ms. Pritchard repeatedly attacked the validity and reliability of the
tests relied upon by the State in assessing sex offenders, including the
Static-99 and another diagnostic tool called the MnSOST-R. She introduced video depositions by experts Dr. Woodworth and Dr. Hart
casting serious doubt on the predictive usefulness of these tests.2 °°
These doubts are reflected in the scholarly literature on this subject.20 1
Dr. Fason made another appearance, saying that Fisher would be
incapable of complying with terms of commitment such as a requirement of regular written assignments. 0 2 Ms. Pritchard was only able to
elicit such testimony in terms of a "hypothetical," because the court
would not allow the jurors to know the actual consequences of their
verdict.20 3 For example, at no point did the court allow the jury to
know that, if they found Fisher to be a "sexually violent predator," he
would be placed in outpatient commitment. Likewise, they were not
made aware of the many elaborate provisions of his commitment
"contract," or that the violation of any provision thereof would lead to
a third-degree felony charge.
Ms. Pritchard tried, unsuccessfully, to bring these facts to light during direct examination of Mr. Fisher's mother. The court sustained
the State's objections to questions like, "Mrs. Fisher, do you want
Mike to be subjected to a third degree felony?" and "Mrs. Fisher, hypothetically, if Michael was given 97 conditions by which to comply or
195. See id. at 74-78.
196. See id. at 49-50.
197. Id. at 56.
198. See id. at 78.
199. See id. at 77-78.
200. See Transcript of Record vol. 4 at 152-81, In re Commitment of Fisher, 164
S.W.3d 637 (Tex. 2005) (No. 00-10-06622-CV) [hereinafter Transcript vol. 4] (copy on
file with author).
201. See, e.g., TERENCE W. CAMPBELL, ASSESSING SEX OFFENDERS: PROBLEMS
AND PITFALLS 83-109 (2004) (questioning validity and reliability of the Static-99 and
the MnSOST-R); DENNIS M. DOREN, EVALUATING SEX OFFENDERS: A MANUAL
FOR CIVIL COMMITMENTS AND BEYOND 125-31 (2002) (same).
202. See Transcript vol. 4, supra note 200, at 55-56.
196
203. See id. at 55.
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felony ... would he be
else he would be subjected to a third degree
20 4
able to comply with those 97 conditions?
Judge and prosecutor maintained the fiction that the court might
tailor the conditions of commitment, rather than rely on the 97 conditions printed in the "Civil Commitment Requirements Treatment and
Supervision Contract."2 5 Ms. Pritchard tried to introduce this document into evidence, but '2the
court excluded the "contract" with the 97
06
provisions as "hearsay.
In closing, Ms. Pritchard, arguing for Fisher, pointed out the unreliability of both the psychological tests and the State's experts. 0 7 She
was not allowed to mention the ramifications of an affirmative verdict-outpatient commitment with impossible requirements.2 0 8 Mr.
Thetford argued for the State, emphasizing how important it
was "to
20 9
ensure that people like Fisher get the help that they need.
There are two elements that must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt in order to label someone a "sexually violent predator": (1) that
the person is a repeat sex offender and (2) that the person "suffers
from a behavioral abnormality that makes the person likely to engage
in a predatory act of sexual violence., 2 10 Because Fisher's "Pen
Packs"-state documents reflecting his convictions-were admitted
into evidence, the court granted a directed verdict as to the first element.2 ' Fisher had been convicted of two prior sexual assaults.
Therefore, the court ultimately charged the jury with one question
only: "Do you find that Michael Fisher suffers from a behavior abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual
violence? ' 212 The jury returned with the answer "yes" in less than
two and a half hours.2 13
B.

Commitment of Fisher v. State

Normally, an appeal from a civil commitment under § 841 would go
to the Ninth District Court of Appeals in Beaumont.2 14 Due to a
clogged docket, however, the Fisher appeal went to the Thirteenth
District in Corpus Christi. 2 15 This would prove important later because it led to a split among the Texas courts of appeal.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 143-44.
See id. at 118-22.
See id.
See Transcript vol. 5, supra note 134, at 18-35.
See id. at 35.
Id. at 52-53.
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.003 (Vernon 2003).
See Transcript vol. 5, supra note 134, at 4-5.
Id. at 16.
See id. at 74-76.
See Counsel Interview, supra note 119.
See id.
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1. Fisher's Argument
On appeal in the Thirteenth District, Fisher, now represented by
Kenneth Balusek of the State Counsel for Offenders, argued that SVP
proceedings are "quasi-criminal" because they can result in deprivation of liberty and should therefore trigger criminal due process protections.2 16 If due process applies, the argument developed, it cannot
be enjoyed by someone who does not comprehend the hearing, and
Fisher's right to attend the hearing and have an attorney was "'a
hollow right"' because he could not understand the proceedings or
assist counsel. 17 He also alleged that the order of commitment was
unconstitutionally vague and that requiring Fisher to testify at the
hearing violated his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.2 1 8
2.

The State's Argument

The State countered that involuntary commitment "'does not itself
trigger the entire range of criminal protections"' and that the SVP
statute was not "quasi-criminal" because the "United States Supreme
219
Court [had] consistently held such statutes to be civil in nature.
The State.further argued that the granting of some criminal procedural rights under the SVP statute did not transform the proceeding
from civil to criminal. 22 0 To this the court agreed. 22 1 Because the statute is civil, and not criminal or "quasi-criminal" in nature, the State
contended, Fisher had no due process right in being sane at the hearing or being able to assist counsel. 222 To this the court did not
agree.22 3
3.

The Opinion

The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas assigned retired
Justice Don Wittig to preside over the case, and Wittig authored the
opinion for the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals. 2 4 The court did not
reach Fisher's arguments about the statute being unconstitutionally
vague or violating his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimina216. See Commitment of Fisher v. State, 123 S.W.3d 828, 834-35 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 2003) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. In re Commitment of Fisher, 164
S.W.3d 637 (Tex. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 428 (2005).
217. Id. at 835.
218. Id. at 831.
219. Id. at 835 (citing Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 260-61 (2001)); see also Kansas
v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-65 (1997) (holding the Kansas SVP statute to be civil,
not criminal); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 372 (1986) (holding that proceedings
under Illinois's "Sexually Dangerous Persons Act" are not criminal).
220. See Commitment of Fisher, 123 S.W.3d at 835.

221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 831 & n.1.
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tion, focusing instead on the issue of his mental capacity."2 5 It distinguished Allen v. Illinois, a case relied on by the State, because it
involved "actual treatment in a psychiatric hospital., 2 1 6 The fact that
incarceration may result for Fisher is "uniquely the case in Texas" and
is "relevant to the question whether the privilege against self-incrimination applies." The court divided the analysis into two main parts:
(1) Fisher's liberty and due process claims, and (2) whether the statute
is punitive.
Liberty and Due Process
The court immediately acknowledged Fisher's liberty interest in the
rendered substantive and procedural due process
proceeding, which
"mandatory. '227 Unlike most states, Texas has no dual requirement of
"current mental illness and dangerousness. 2 2 8 Citing numerous
precedents, the court maintained that "'there is no conceivable basis
for distinguishing the commitment of a person who is nearing the end
of a penal term from all other civil commitments. ' ' 22 9 "'Freedom
from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by due process from arbitrary governmental action.'" 2 30 ,,,It is
depriclear that commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant
231
vation of liberty that requires due process protection."'
Significantly, the court noted that a mental incompetent cannot be
held to a contract.2 3 2 "[I]f a person cannot contract away his property
without mental capacity, can the government force an incompetent to
sign a civil commitment contract the person cannot comprehend or
keep? May mentally retarded persons sign away their liberties?
Fisher was ordered to sign such a contract. '23 3 The opinion went on
to state that people do not lose their fundamental rights simply by
virtue of mental illness. 23 4 The Texas SVP act does not provide equal
protection for the mentally ill or retarded.23 5 It also does not provide
for a finding that the person cannot control his sexual impulses, as
mandated by the Supreme Court. 3 6 The statute provides for assistance of counsel, but fails to ensure that the person be able to enjoy
that right, as required by due process. 237 Therefore, the court concluded, the statute was unconstitutional as applied to Fisher, regarda.

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at 831.
Id. at 835 (comparing with Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986)).
Id. at 836.
Id. (comparing with Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 78 (1992)).
Id. (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 724 (1972)).
Id. (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982)).
Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983)).
Id. at 837 (citing Dexter v. Hall, 82 U.S. 9, 21 (1872)).
Id. at 837.
See id. at 837 (citing Barclay v. Campbell, 704 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Tex. 1986)).
See id. at 837.
Id. at 838 (citing Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002)).
See id.
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less of whether it was fundamentally civil or quasi-criminal in
nature.238
b.

Civil or Criminal?

In addressing the question whether the SVP statute is punitive and
therefore criminal, the court began by enumerating the criminal law
safeguards it does and does not provide. The statute provides for
findings beyond a reasonable doubt, right to counsel, and trial by jury,
but does not provide for the right of competency, the right against
self-incrimination, or protections from double jeopardy or ex post
facto application.2 3 9
The court conceded that some of the State's arguments had merit:
(1) that if the statute is civil, the "as applied" argument may fail, (2)
that Fisher's claim that he is "doomed to violate the terms of commitment" is not certain, and (3) that if he does violate the terms he will
have an opportunity to challenge the criminal penalty when it actually
applies to him.2 4 ° Acknowledging that Hendricks is the leading case
in this area, the court noted Justice Kennedy's concurrence in that
case warning that "mental and medical treatment should not be a
sham for punishment. 21 4 1 Conceding that the Texas SVP statute is
similar to the Kansas law held constitutional in Hendricks, the court
noted "striking and material differences ... 242
The best way to explore these differences, the court decided, was to
apply the same test that the Hendricks court applied. First is the question of statutory construction: "If the Legislature meant to establish
'civil' proceedings, we should ordinarily defer to its intent unless there
is the clearest proof that the scheme is so punitive in purpose or effect
that it negates the State's attempt to deem that statute civil. '2 43 In
search of this "clearest proof," courts look to various factors articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether
it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution
and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned.2 44
238. Id.
239. Id. at 838 n.8.
240. See id. at 839.
241. Id. (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).

242. Id.
243. Id. at 839-40 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361).
244. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
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The Thirteenth District Court of Appeals in Corpus Christi did not
examine all of these factors, but it addressed several of them.
The court observed that, unlike the Kansas SVP statute, the Texas
statute, unique among all the states, "imposes severe criminal penalties for the violation of any of the terms of commitment." '45 It then
considered the ramifications of such a violation. Most people committed under the statute (not including, for example, those found not
guilty by reason of insanity of a sexually violent crime) have at least
two prior felony convictions, which would automatically lead to an
enhanced sentence of 25-99 years in prison.2 4 6 If the prior felony is an
aggravated sexual assault, the person faces a mandatory life sentence.24 7 As a result, "[i]n practical legal effect, if Fisher or anyone
with a prior aggravated sexual assault conviction, uses a post office
box or stops to help a person 'stranded on the road' that person is
subject to a mandatory life sentence. "248
Thus, the court concluded, the statute was criminal because it embraced the two objectives of criminal punishment: retribution and deterrence. 249 The statute was retributive because it punished for past
criminal conduct and was a deterrent because the violation of its terms
could lead to a lengthy term of imprisonment.2 50 Labeling the statute
"civil" could not alone save it from being criminal, nor could placing it
in the Health and Safety Code rather than the Criminal Code. 251 The
court noted that many criminal provisions appear in Texas's Health
and Safety Code, including various drug crimes.2
To underscore the clear punitive purpose of the Texas SVP statute,
the court asked a rhetorical question:
If the State's true intent was to treat Fisher, why was he not offered
or required to undergo treatment before his release from prison?
And now after his release . . .he is not given the alternative of
inpatient or other mental health treatment. Rather, under the judgment, his alternative to the 100-plus
terms of commitment is a life
25 3
sentence in the penitentiary.
The 108 restraints on Fisher's liberty "far exceed[ed] normal criminal
law probation or community supervision" and created "a general deterrent effect" impermissible in a non-criminal context.2 5 4 The conditions "can hardly be said to [have been] less restrictive or coercive
245. Commitment of Fisher, 123 S.W.3d at 840.
246. See id.
247. Id.
248. Id.; see also id. at 855 (referencing items 48 and 55 of the Civil Commitment
Requirements: Treatment and Supervision Contract).
249. See Commitment of Fisher, 123 S.W.3d at 840.
250. See id.
251. See id. at 841.
252. See id.
253. Id. at 842 n.17.
254. Id. at 844.
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than the conditions of a patient at a Texas mental institution." ' Indeed, it went on, the restrictions were "more onerous than conventional civil commitment" and even "more onerous than many
comparable penal provisions."25' Furthermore, the disabilities placed
on Fisher "[were] not tailored to his individual needs but rather represent[ed] a net cast to the broadest reach of possible variables."2 7
Therefore, the statute was "excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assignable to it," said "alternative purpose" being treatment.2 5 8
The court acknowledged that the law does not require the State to
provide adequate treatment but can commit the untreatably insane if
they pose a danger to others.25 9 If, however, the question of treat2 60
ment is irrelevant, there must be a finding of "lack of control.
This, the court asserted, was the requirement of Kansas v. Crane, one
of the progeny of Hendricks that emphasized the distinction that must
be drawn between sex offenders subject to civil commitment and
"other dangerous persons more properly dealt with in criminal proceedings . .. 'lest "civil commitment" become a "mechanism for retribution or general deterrence."' .261 In Hendricks, Hendricks himself
admitted that he was unable to stop molesting children. The absence
of a "lack of control" element merely lent further weight to the court's
conclusion that the statute was fundamentally punitive and therefore
criminal.26 2 The court accordingly reversed and remanded the case.263
c.

Collision Course

The problem raised by the Thirteenth District Court's holding was
that the issue of whether the Texas SVP statute was civil or criminal
had already been addressed by the Ninth District Court of Appeals in
Beaumont-with opposite results.26 4 In Beasley v. Molett, the Ninth
District held, inter alia, that the statute was non-punitive because "restraints in the context of involuntary civil commitments have historically been treated as civil, not punitive. Commitment under the Act
involves no finding of scienter. It does not involve retribution because
255. Id.
256. Id. at 845.
257. Id. at 846.
258. Id. (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963) (outlining
factors used to determine if statute is civil or criminal)).
259. See id. at 847 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 366 (1997) (Kennedy,
J., concurring)).
260. See id. (citing Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002)).
261. Id. (quoting Crane, 534 U.S. at 412); see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S.
346, 371-73 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (warning against the inherent dangers of
using a civil confinement statute in conjunction with a criminal process).
262. See Commitment of Fisher, 123 S.W.3d at 848.
263. Id. at 851.
264. See Beasley v. Molett, 95 S.W.3d 590 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002, pet.
denied).
202
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it does not fix culpability for prior criminal conduct. 2' 65 The Thirteenth District Court of Appeals in Corpus Christi noted the disagreement on the nature of the statute and made a reasonable prediction:
"We trust this respectful disagreement should be and will be ad'266
dressed by higher authorities.
C.

In the Supreme Court of Texas

Chief Justice Wallace Jefferson authored the opinion for the Texas
Supreme Court. 267 Dan Maeso, Ken Balusek, and other attorneys
with the State Counsel for Offenders represented Michael Fisher. 6 8
After recapitulating the general provisions of the SVP statute, the
Court noted in passing that, although the State of Texas is unique in
having outpatient commitment for SVPs, other states provide criminal
penalties for attempting to escape from inpatient commitment. 69 Unlike the Court of Appeals, the Texas Supreme Court did not limit its
analysis solely to the issue of competence, but addressed Fisher's
other complaints-unconstitutional vagueness and Fifth Amendment
violation-as well.27 ° The Court wished to "address several aspects of
the Act's'constitutionality. ' '27 1 Because the Court of Appeals had not
specified whether it relied on the United States or the Texas Constitution, the Court limited its analysis to the United States Constitution,
with the assumption that the Texas Constitution is congruent therewith.27 2 It noted that any analysis of a statute's constitutionality must
begin with a presumption of validity.2 73
1. Civil or Criminal: The Complete Kennedy Test
The first major step in the analysis addressed Fisher's due process
rights relating to his competence. 274 To make this determination, the
275
Court had to determine whether the statute was punitive or civil.
Weighing in favor of a holding that it is civil were the numerous decisions by other courts holding other state's SVP statutes to be civil and
non-punitive.27 6 Next, like the Court of Appeals, it looked at the leg7 7 "Unquestionably,
islative labeling of the statute.2
the Legislature
265. Id. at 607.
266. Commitment of Fisher, 123 S.W.3d at 848 n.27.
267. In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637, 639 (Tex. 2005), cert. denied, 126
S. Ct. 428 (2005).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 642 n.6.
270. See id. at 645 & n.8.
271. Id. at 645.
272. See id.
273. Id.
274. See id.
275. Id.
276. See id. at 646.
277. See id.
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gave the Act a civil edifice."2'78 Again like the lower court, however,
the Court acknowledged that the "'civil label is not always dispositive"' and will be rejected if there is "'the clearest proof' that the
statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention. ' 27 9 Because courts look at legislative inof the statute, the process is known as
tent first and then at the 28effects
0
the "intent-effects test.
The Court disposed of the intent portion of the test quickly, noting
only that the legislative findings refer to public safety and treatment,
and not to punishment. 281 Next, turning to the effects test, the Court,
like the lower court and like the U.S. Supreme Court in Hendricks,
employed a multi-factor analysis from the 1963 case, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.28 a Unlike the lower court and the Hendricks court,
however, the Texas Supreme Court did not pick and choose some
28 3
Kennedy factors to evaluate, but looked at all of them individually.
Although "neither exhaustive nor dispositive," the factors outlined in
Kennedy include:
(1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint;
(2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment;
(3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter;
(4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence;
(5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime;
(6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it; and
(7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.2 8
The Court evaluated each of these factors under a separate subheading.
a. Affirmative Disability or Restraint
Quoting Hendricks, the Court noted that "'the mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the
government has imposed punishment." 8 5 In stark contrast to the
Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court placed no emphasis on the nu278. Id. at 647.
279. Id. (quoting Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986)); Kansas v. Hendricks,
521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)
(alteration in original)).
280. In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d at 647.
281. See id.
282. Id. at 647-48; see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69
(1963) (outlining factors used to determine if statute is civil or criminal).
283. In re Commitment of'Fisher, 164 S.W.3d at 647-53.
284. Id. at 647-48 (citing Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (outlining factors used to
determine if statute is civil or criminal)).
2OZ
285. Id. at 648 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997)).
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merous and severe restraints on Fisher's liberty imposed by the contractual requirements. Instead, it pointed out that the SVP statute
imposes no physical restraint.28 6 The restraints imposed on Fisher
under the terms of his outpatient commitment, though real, the Court
deemed to be no greater than those imposed in inpatient commitment.28 7 This factor therefore pointed toward the statute being nonpunitive.2 88
b.

Historical View

Civil commitment has not traditionally been considered punitive.
Again, relying on Hendricks, the Court asserts the confinement of the
dangerously mentally ill to be a "'classic example of non-punitive detention.' ,2 89 Ignoring, for the time being, the criminal penalties associated with the violation of the outpatient commitment provisions, the
Court essentially equates the statutory scheme under the Texas SVP
statute with any other civil commitment. Therefore, the historical
view also tilts toward a non-punitive finding.2 9 °
c.

Retribution, Deterrence, and Scienter

Although the Kennedy Court analyzed scienter separately from retribution and deterrence, the Texas Supreme Court chose, without explanation, to combine them in its Fisher analysis.29 1 It disposed of
retribution quickly, saying simply that "the Act is not retributive because it does not fix liability for prior criminal conduct ....
Instead,
such conduct is used for evidentiary purposes., 292 It also pointed out
that some people who are not convicted (e.g., those acquitted by reason of insanity) may also be placed under civil commitment.2 93
With respect to scienter, the mens rea or "guilty mind" requirement
of much criminal law, the Court found none under the SVP statute.29 4
Instead, the commitment determination is based on the person's "behavioral abnormality" without regard to any criminal intent. 295 The
Court of Appeals, the opinion went on, was incorrect to focus on the
intent to commit the underlying crimes that qualified the person for
SVP commitment.2 9 6 The Court noted that scienter would be required
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 648-50.
Id. (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362 (1997)).
See id. at 649.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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to convict a person for violating a condition of commitment, but this
would be a separate inquiry in the context of a criminal trial.29 7
On deterrence, the Court opined that the SVP statute could not act
as a deterrent because those committed under it, having a "behavioral
abnormality," are unlikely to be deterred. Again the analogy is to
Hendricks, where "'persons committed under the [Kansas] Act are, by
definition, suffering from a "mental abnormality" or a "personality
disorder" that prevents them from exercising adequate control over
their behavior."' 298 The Court fails to address whether such an inability to control one's behavior could make it difficult, if not impossible,
to adhere to the terms of outpatient commitment. Rather, it praises
the outpatient program as less restrictive than the Kansas program,
where SVPs are confined in secure facilities. 299 An "incidental deterrent effect," it added, would not suffice to make the statute
punitive.3 °°
d.

Whether the Act Applies to Behavior Already a Crime

If a statute applies to behavior that is already a crime, it is more
likely to be found punitive. 30 1 Although the vast majority of SVPs are
categorized as such based on prior convictions for sexually violent offenses, the Court was able to dispose of this factor easily by pointing
out that people found not guilty by reason of insanity may also face
commitment under the statute.30 2 Thus, "[b]ecause the Act does not
factor does not
categorically apply only to convicted individuals, this
30 3
punitive.
is
Act
the
that
finding
of
favor
in
weigh
e.

Rational Connection to Non-punitive Purpose

The Court recognized the state's twofold interest in passing the SVP
statute, and these should ring familiar: (1) its parens patriaepower to
care for people unable to care for themselves, and (2) its police powers to protect the public from dangerous individuals.30 4 The Court
had no difficulty finding the statute connected to the State's goals of
long-term supervision and treatment, and did not attempt to address
whether it approached these goals adequately or even rationally.
f

Excessiveness

The Court of Appeals had held that the statute was excessive because the disabilities placed on Fisher "[were] not tailored to his indi297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

See id. at 649 n.12.
Id. at 649 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362-63 (1997)).
See id. at 650.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 650-51.
Id. at 651.
Id.
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vidual needs but rather represent[ed] a net cast to the broadest reach
of possible variables."3 5 In the Texas Supreme Court's view, because
of the felony charges associated with violating the provisions of outpatient commitment, "the Texas Act appears at once less restrictive and
potentially more restrictive than its out-of-state counterparts. ' 30 6 The
Court found precedents for criminal penalties associated with the violation of civil statutes, noting that the U.S. Supreme Court had held
these constitutional.30 7 Notably, these laws included sex offender registration laws, under which failure to register was a crime.30 8 On balance, "the freedom from confinement outweighs the criminal sanction
imposed for a failure to obey the commitment conditions., 30 9 The
Court reiterated its view that the outpatient regime in Texas is "far
less restrictive" than the inpatient commitment scheme in Kansas that
31
the U.S. Supreme Court had held constitutional in Hendricks. 1
Because the Court found that all the factors (or "useful guideposts") under Kennedy pointed toward a non-punitive statute, Fisher
had failed to provide the "clearest proof" that the statute was punitive
in effect. Therefore, the Court would proceed under the assumption
3 11
that it was civil.
The striking thing about the Kennedy factors analysis is its subjectivity. Although the Court of Appeals did not address all of the factors,
no doubt any one of them could be decided either way in this case.
The excessiveness factor, for instance, and the diametrically opposite
views on it taken by the Court of Appeals and the Texas Supreme
Court, is perhaps the most glaring example of this subjectivity. The
importance of this consideration should not be underestimated: virtually all else in the decision hinged on whether the statute was civil or
criminal, and choosing to regard it as civil through a subjective analysis determined the rest of the case.
2.

A House of Cards

Fisher's argument on competence failed because competency hearings are not required for civil proceedings.3 1 2 Moreover, by their very
nature, civil commitments often involve individuals who would be incompetent to stand trial.31 3 Were Fisher to violate the terms of his
305. See Commitment of Fisher v. State, 123 S.W.3d 828, 846 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2003) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637
(Tex. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 428 (2005).
306. In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d at 652.
307. See id.
308. See id. at 652-53 (citing cases arising out of state statutes imposing criminal
penalties for violations of civil statutes).
309. Id. at 652.
310. See id. at 653.
311. See id.
312. See id. at 654.
313. See id. at 653-54.
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commitment, he would be afforded full criminal due process in any
trial for the resulting felony charge.3 14 He would be entitled to a competency hearing at that time.315 In addition, if "incompetence dooms
him to violate the court's commitment order, Fisher may raise lack of
scienter as a defense in any such criminal proceeding."3 1' 6 Similarly,
Fisher's Fifth Amendment claim failed, in part because there was no
specific question at the commitment hearing that subjected Fisher to
future criminal liability.3 1 7
On the issue of vagueness, Fisher made a threefold argument: (1)
the Act is vague because it fails to individualize treatment; (2) its "behavioral abnormality" label is vague because it does not reflect a medical diagnosis; and (3) the provisions of the "Treatment and
Supervision Contract" are vague (especially with regard to who is "a
potential victim") and allow arbitrary enforcement.3 1 8 The Court
noted that Fisher had failed to preserve the vagueness issue below, but
rather than decide whether a facial vagueness challenge must be preserved at trial to be addressed on appeal, the Court chose to point out
why it would fail anyway.31 9
Fisher would bear "the heavy burden of showing that the Act is
unconstitutional in every possible application. '3 20 In addressing
Fisher's first vagueness argument, the Court correctly asserted that
the trial court has discretion to tailor the commitment restrictions to
suit the individual SVP. 3 21 It neglected to mention that such tailoring
simply does not occur in practice.3 2 2 On Fisher's second vagueness
point, the Court observed that the language in the Texas statute regarding "behavioral abnormality" is quite similar to language in other
states' SVP statutes, such as the phrase "mental abnormality" in the
Kansas SVP statute, which was held constitutional in Hendricks.3 23
Furthermore, "the United States Supreme Court has 'never required
state legislatures to adopt any particular nomenclature in drafting civil
314. See id. at 654.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 18-20, In re Commitment of Fisher, 164
S.W.3d 637 (Tex. 2005) (No. 04-0112).
319. See In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d at 654-55.
320. Id. at 655.
321. Id.
322. See Counsel Interview, supra note 119; Commitment of Fisher v. State, 123
S.W.3d 828, 852-58 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003) (en banc) (reproducing the
Civil Commitment Requirements: Treatment and Supervision Contract), rev'd sub
nom. In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
428 (2005). In order to demonstrate that the same contractual commitments are imposed on all committed SVPs, Dixie Pritchard of the State Counsel for Offenders
attempted unsuccessfully to have the Treatment and Supervision Contract introduced
as evidence at Fisher's commitment hearing. See Transcript vol. 4, supra note 200, at
118-22.
323. In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d at 655-56.
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commitment statutes.' ,3 24 In short, legal terms need not reflect medical diagnoses.3 2 5
Finally, the fact that some of the contractual requirements of outpatient commitment are inappropriate for Fisher was really an argument
that the Act is unconstitutional as applied to him.3 26 Again, the Court
had already made clear that Fisher would have to prove the statute
unconstitutional in all applications.32 7 Moreover, the Court continued, had Fisher raised this issue at trial, the trial court might have
modified some of the conditions at his request.32 8 Again, this ignores
reality. Nevertheless, all of Fisher's arguments failed. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and rendered judgment
civilly committing Fisher as specified in the trial court's original
order.32 9

V.

THE AFTERMATH: STATUTORY CHANGES
AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In 2003, and again in 2005, the Texas Legislature made substantive
revisions to the SVP statute. For example, in 2005, § 841.150 of the
Texas Health and Safety Code transformed substantially. The section,
originally added in 2003, had been entitled "Effect of Certain Subsequent Convictions, Judgments, or Verdicts on Order of Civil Commitment. ' 330 It provided for the suspension of outpatient commitment
during any period of incarceration. The 2005 version bears the title
"Effect of Subsequent Commitment or Confinement on Order of Civil
Commitment. '3 31 It too provides for suspension of outpatient commitment during confinement, but emphasizes inpatient commitment
in a community center, mental health facility, or state school. 332 This
change seems to somewhat clarify the relationship between outpatient
commitment of SVPs and inpatient commitment of the mentally ill
under the older statute.3 3 3 In other words, if a person is involuntarily
committed to an inpatient facility under § 574, his outpatient commitment under § 841 is suspended for the duration of his confinement.
Dan Maeso, who represented Michael Fisher before the Texas Supreme Court, informed the Author that Fisher is now on inpatient
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

Id. at 656 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997)).
See id.
See id.
See id. at 655.
Id. at 656.
Id.

330.
331.
332.
333.

TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.150 (Vernon 2003).
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.150 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
See id.
See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 574.001 to .154 (Vernon 2003 &

Supp. 2006).
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psychiatric commitment in Kerrville State Hospital.3 34 This outcome
is remarkably like the recommendation of Dr. Jennings at Fisher's
SVP commitment hearing.33 5
Another recent change to the SVP statute allows the court to appoint outside counsel for alleged SVPs if no representative of the Office of the State Counsel for Offenders is available.33 6 New changes
have also softened language directing the State's "multidisciplinary
team" of experts to "assess" rather than "determine" whether an individual is a sexually violent predator.3 3 7 Another substantive change to
the statute provides that, if an alleged SVP refuses to cooperate with
the multidisciplinary team during their assessment, this may be used
as evidence against him at trial. In addition, he may not be able to
have his own experts testify, and he may face contempt charges.3 38
Perhaps the most significant change to the statute comes under
"Commitment Requirements."' 33 9 The court must now require the
committed SVP "to reside in a Texas residential facility under contract" with the Council on Sex Offender Treatment.3 4 ° This change
should allow closer supervision of the committed person, reducing the
likelihood of violations, and may represent a step in the right direction. 34 ' This "halfway house" approach also begins to resemble inpatient commitment, with potential increases in quality of treatment,
public safety, and, naturally, expense.
The question remains: What is the real purpose of the Texas SVP
statute? It has been described as merely a "feel good" statute allowing legislators to appear tough on sex offenders and as a cheap
"funnel" back to the penitentiary. 342 If the purpose of the statute is
punitive, as the Court of Appeals held, the accused should, at the very
least, be afforded criminal due process rights during the commitment
proceeding, including the right to be competent to stand trial. A competency determination would, among other things, have the salutary
effect of indicating whether commitment under § 841, the SVP statute, is called for, or whether inpatient commitment under the older
§ 574 of the Health and Safety Code is more appropriate.
Of course, the real problem with recognizing the punitive nature of
the statute is the constitutional issues that would re-emerge as a result.
If the statute is punitive, then the commitment would violate the
double jeopardy and ex post facto prohibitions of the United States
334. See Telephone Interview with Dan Maeso, formerly of the State Counsel for
Offenders (Oct. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Maeso Interview] (notes on file with author).
335. See Transcript vol. 2, supra note 136, at 151-53.
336. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.005(b) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
337. See id. § 841.022(c).
338. Id. § 841.061(f).
339. See id. § 841.082.
340. Id. § 841.082(a)(1).
341. See Counsel Interview, supra note 119.
342. Id.
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Constitution, as the Hendricks court recognized when evaluating the
Kansas SVP statute.3 43 But if the statute's purpose is actually punitive, there are more forthright ways to punish sex offenders than
resorting to an unconstitutional commitment regime. One simple solution could be longer prison sentences for sex crimes, as exemplified
by the recently-passed Lunsford Act in Florida.3 4 4 Alternatively, the
State could keep the existing criminal penalties and limit plea bargains
for sex offenses.3 45 Often, prosecutors offer plea bargains to sex offenders to avoid bringing child witnesses, who may be traumatized by
the experience, to testify. 346 Another, less laudable reason, is that the
prosecutors know that the offender will be civilly, and indefinitely,
committed under the SVP statute immediately upon release from
prison.34 7 Why bother sentencing to a long term of years when you
can commit for a lifetime?
The statute does have its defenders, however. Dr. Rahn Bailey, a
psychiatrist who frequently serves on the multidisciplinary team assessing alleged SVPs, has praised the state's "moderate approach."34' 8
While acknowledging that controversy exists among clinical professionals about this type of commitment, Dr. Bailey wrote, "Texas, by
using the least restrictive alternative of outpatient treatment is able to
provide civil commitment at a greatly diminished cost. '3 49 Other writers have praised this "innovative" program, even suggesting that, if
successful, "it350 should serve as model for other states and
communities.
How successful is it? The Executive Director of the Council on Sex
Offender Treatment, the state organization responsible for the treatment and supervision of SVPs, was kind enough to provide the Author recent statistics on the program. As of November 2006, Texas
has placed sixty-eight SVPs on outpatient commitment.3 5 1 Twentyseven of these are currently living in the community. 35 2 Twenty-nine
354
have returned to prison. 353 Five have returned to prison twice.
343. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997); U.S.

CONST.

art. I, § 9, cl. 3;

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

344. See Florida Governor Signs Jessica Lunsford Act, USA TODAY, May 2, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-05-02-lunsford-actx.htm?POE=
NEWISVA.
345. Maeso Interview, supra note 334.
346. See Counsel Interview, supra note 119.
347. See id.
348. Bailey, supra note 111.
349. Id.
350. Walter J. Meyer et al., Outpatient Civil Commitment in Texas for Management
and Treatment of Sexually Violent Predators:A Preliminary Report, 47 INT'L J. OF
OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 396, 405 (2003).
351. E-mail from Allison Taylor, Executive Director, Council on Sex Offender
Treatment, to author (Nov. 13, 2006, 09:51:57 CST) (on file with author).
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

37

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 13 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 7

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

None of the violations leading to re-arrest or re-incarceration involved
a sexual offense. 5
Outpatient commitment may be appropriate for some offenders. It
clearly was not appropriate for Michael Fisher. It is difficult to understand why the State of Texas is so reluctant to provide criminal due
process rights to offenders during SVP hearings. If part of the rationale behind the statute is that sex offenders are not mentally ill and
are therefore "not amenable to traditional mental illness treatment
modalities,"3 '5 6 then it should follow that someone who is mentally ill
and could benefit from "traditional mental illness treatment modalities" is a poor candidate for SVP labeling. Providing criminal due
process rights, including the right to be competent at trial, would weed
out mentally ill individuals like Fisher. Commitment proceedings
could then occur under the older Texas Mental Health Code § 574.
This would provide better protection to the public and more appropriate treatment for the mentally ill, thus serving the two rationales underlying civil commitment: police power and parens patriae.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Texas has a unique approach to handling "sexually violent
predators." Unlike the other seventeen states with SVP statutes providing for inpatient civil commitment, Texas is alone in providing outpatient commitment for those found to be "sexually violent
predators." This unique solution brings with it unique problems. In re
Commitment of Fisher gives insight into the workings and shortcomings of the Texas SVP statute.
It is questionable whether the outpatient regime serves the traditional twin purposes of civil commitment: protecting the public (police
power) and treating the individual (parenspatriae). In practice, it also
appears that the statute is punitive in both purpose and effect. Because of this punitive nature, at the very least, an individual facing
civil commitment as an SVP should be afforded criminal due process
rights, including the right to be competent at the commitment hearing.
Those found incompetent could then be excluded from the SVP category and committed to inpatient treatment under the older civil commitment statute, Texas Mental Health Code § 574. However, if the
statute were recognized as punitive, it would also be unconstitutional
because it violates the ex post facto and double jeopardy prohibitions
of the United States Constitution.3 5 7
Other solutions to the problem of repeat sex offenders that might
be superior to the current outpatient commitment scheme include
longer prison sentences for sex offenders and limiting plea bargains
355. Id.
356. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.001 (Vernon 2003).
357. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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for sex offenses. Another, admittedly costly solution would be to provide for inpatient commitment as practiced in other states. In the last
two years, the Texas SVP statute has undergone changes that appear
to be marginal improvements. For example, the statute now requires
committed SVPs to reside in a "halfway house" environment, thereby
hopefully providing better treatment for offenders and better protection for the public. More fundamental changes are needed, however,
if Texas law on sex offenders is ever to emerge from the shadows.
Ronnie Hall
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